A rchive Date
[ 22-07-2004 ]
Category
[ International Relations ]
sub-Categoy
[ U.S ]
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[http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/World/2004/07/22/553165-cp.html
Commission blames Sept. 11 attacks on mistakes and 'failure of imagination'
By BETH GORHAM
WASHINGTON (CP) - President George W. Bush escaped specific blame for the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in a final commission report Thursday that faulted a "failure of imagination" and "unexploited opportunities."
But the bipartisan panel, which spent 20 months investigating the attacks, said he's got to move fast on major security changes before another catastrophe if he wants to escape the wrath of Americans. "We were unprepared," said commission head Tom Kean.
"We did not grasp the magnitude of a threat that had been gathering over a considerable period of time.
"This was a failure of policy, management, capability and, above all, a failure of imagination."
The commission, which reviewed 2.5 million documents and conducted 1,200 interviews, was careful not to single out Bush or his predecessor, Bill Clinton. But it said neither understood the gravity of the al-Qaida threat and didn't make it a top priority.
It outlined several missteps allowing the 19 hijackers to kill nearly 3,000 people that day, stopping short of saying the suicide missions could have been prevented.
"I can't say we are sure," said Kean. "We do not know. We think it's possible."
Americans will be quick to judge though, commissioners said, if the government doesn't act now, particularly since top Bush officials have warned another attack may well be in the works this year.
The suggested overhaul includes a national counterterrorism centre, a new intelligence czar to oversee some 15 different services and a specially trained FBI team.
"If something bad happens while these recommendations are sitting there, the American people will quickly fix political responsibility for failure and that responsibility may last for generations," said commissioner James Thompson.
At least one panel member, Bob Kerrey, said he's not optimistic about fast changes during an election year that will require a lot of people, departments and agencies to cede authority.
Another, Timothy Roemer, was more confident.
"The perfect storm is coming together politically. The eyes of history are no our backs, the claws of al-Qaida are on our shoulders and the grief of 9/11 is still in so many Americans' hearts."
While the commission let Bush off the hook, saying Congress wasn't properly engaged and he was ill-advised by intelligence agencies that didn't share information, the report does provide some fodder for critics who say the president was distracted from terrorism during his first nine months in office.
And the commission's finding that Iran allowed safe passage to some of the hijackers before Sept. 11 adds fuel to arguments that Bush was focused on the wrong enemy, Iraq.
The report says there were some "friendly contacts" between Iraq and al-Qaida but not a collaborative relationship, disputing statements from the Bush officials who have long suggested much closer ties and used them as a reason to invade the country.
Still, the report may have little overall impact on generally high approval ratings from Americans on how the president has conducted the anti-terror effort.
The panel noted that Americans, reporters and legislators weren't talking about the issue during the 2000 presidential election.
"We can find only one reference to terrorism in the entire campaign," said Kean.
Bush, who created a sprawling Department of Homeland Security in the wake of the attacks, said Thursday the commission provided "very solid, sound recommendations about how to move forward.
"I assured them that where the government needs to act, we will . . . The most important duty we have is the security of our fellow countrymen."
Democrat John Kerry, who will accept his party's presidential nomination next week, said he'd convene an emergency security summit if he's elected Nov. 2 and Bush hasn't implemented any of the measures.
The commission identified several operational failures that allowed the al-Qaida plot to succeed, including the lack of a viable plan to kill or capture terrorist leader Osama bin Laden.
Officials failed to catch false statements on terrorist visa applications or detect false passports and the government lost track of two al-Qaida hijackers known to the CIA who entered the United States in the summer of 2001.
The report recommends the U.S. embark on a global public relations campaign to defeat militant Islamic ideology and use more safeguards at home, like improving terrorist watch lists and using better technology to screen visitors.
"There is no silver bullet or decisive blow that can defeat Islamic terrorism," said commission vice-chairman Lee Hamilton.
"It will take unity of effort and sustained and effective use of every tool at our disposal. We need to play offence, to kill or to capture the terrorists, deny them sanctuaries and disrupt their ability to move money and people around the globe."
Major findings by the Sept. 11 commission in its final report:
- Unsuccessful diplomacy. From 1997 to Sept. 11, 2001, the U.S. government unsuccessfully tried diplomatic pressure to persuade the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to stop providing sanctuary to al-Qaida. U.S. officials couldn't persuade the United Arab Emirates, one of three countries that had diplomatic relations with the Taliban, to cut off ties with the regime. The Saudi and U.S. governments did not fully share intelligence information or collaborate to disrupt al-Qaida finances.
- Lack of military options. Senior military officials and policy-makers placed great emphasis on "actionable intelligence" in deciding whether to strike Osama bin Laden. On three occasions in 1998-1999, intelligence was credible enough to warrant planning for possible strikes, but policy-makers decided the risks of error outweighed the benefits.
- Intelligence failures. Agencies struggled during the 1990s to collect intelligence on the developing terrorist threat, but were hobbled by flat budgets, an outdated structure and bureaucratic rivalries. While there were many reports on bin Laden, no comprehensive review was undertaken to analyse them. The CIA was constrained by using proxies to try and capture bin Laden and his associates in Afghanistan.
- FBI troubles. FBI and Justice Department officials became increasingly concerned during the 1990s about a terror threat from Islamic extremists to the United States. But significant resources were devoted to case-specific prosecutions and after-the-fact investigations of terror attacks rather than prevention.
- Weak border and immigration controls. The 19 hijackers included known al-Qaida operatives who could have been put on government watch lists; presented fraudulent or otherwise suspicious-looking passports; made false statements to border officials; and violated immigration laws. Yet none were caught, in part because border protection was not a national security issue before Sept. 11, 2001.
- Weak aviation security. Hijackers studied publicly available information on aviation security to exploit weaknesses. They slipped through airport security checkpoints even after being selected for extra baggage screening. While two of the hijackers were on a government terrorist watch list, the Federal Aviation Administration did not use the data.
- Terrorist financing. The hijacking plot cost somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 US to execute. The conspiracy made extensive use of U.S. banks, with hijackers opening accounts in their own names and using passports, but their transactions were unremarkable and essentially invisible. It is still unknown where the money came from, but al-Qaida had many sources of funding; if one dried up, others were available.
- Vulnerable homeland security. Confusion reigned among FAA and military officials the day of the attacks. FAA officials trained to respond to a traditional hijacking, not a suicide attack, were slow to alert the military, and some military fighter pilots were never told why they were scrambled. Communication was poor.
- Slow emergency response. Basic flaws in New York City's emergency 911 phone system denied people inside the World Trade Center potentially lifesaving information. With the buildings' public address systems out of service, workers inside who called 911 for help were told not to evacuate. Communication was poor among first responders, due in part to a lack of operating procedures and substandard radios.
- Poor congressional oversight. Congress was slow to recognize the growing terror threat; it also gave little guidance to executive branch agencies. It did not perform robust oversight to identify and resolve apparent problems in national security and domestic agencies that were readily apparent after Sept. 11.
 World Fact Book (CIA)]
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