A rchive Date
[ 25-01-2004 ]
Category
[ International Relations ]
sub-Categoy
[ U.S ]
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[http://www.canoe.ca/Columnists/worthington_jan25.html
The myth of military 'intelligence'
U.S. Civil war would have been no contest, except for the blundering of Union spies
By PETER WORTHINGTON -- Toronto Sun
January 25, 2004
His new best-seller, Intelligence in War, has earned author John Keegan (recently knighted "Sir John") an accolade from The New York Times as the world's greatest military historian. It's a legitimate tribute.
From studying campaigns "from Napoleon to al-Qaida," Keegan comes to the not-surprising conclusion that "Intelligence is the handmaiden, not the mistress of the warrior." For example, in the U.S. Civil War - arguably the most studied and analyzed war in history - Keegan says Stonewall Jackson's Shenandoah Valley campaign of 1861-62 was so successful because his local "intelligence" far exceeded the Union Army's.
He doesn't mention it, but Keegan might also have noted that Jackson's daring and speed were factors in his successes. He moved his troops so fast they were known as "foot cavalry" and reached the site of battles far quicker than expected, which caught Union commanders by surprise. The Union's "intelligence" of Jackson's capabilities was weak or flawed.
What Keegan doesn't dwell on in his book and the U.S. Civil War (he's planning a book on that war) is how the Union Army's spies and secret service may have prevented the North from winning the war in 1862 instead of 1865.
It's a curious oversight by Keegan which deserves mention, presuming he knew about it.
Shelby Foote's trilogy, The Civil War, mentions it, as do the esteemed Civil War Dictionary and the Historical Times Encyclopedia of the Civil War. The villain (if that's not too judgmental a description) who cost the Union victory in 1862, was Allan Pinkerton, the Scottish-born detective who organized spies and the federal Secret Service that Maj.-Gen. George McClellan depended on.
Hailed as the "Young Napoleon," McClellan was wildly popular among his troops, and President Abraham Lincoln replaced the aged Mexican war hero Gen. Winfield Scott with McClellan as commander-in-chief.
McClellan relied totally on Pinkerton, who considered himself the Union's greatest spy master. When McClellan led the 100,000-man Union army on the St. James Peninsula campaign to capture the Confederate capital of Richmond, Va., Pinkerton's network of spies repeatedly warned that the Confederate Army was bigger than it was. In fact, only 17,000 Confederate troops of Maj.-Gen. John Magruder defended Richmond.
After a series of skirmishes and fights, the inherently cautious McClellan kept asking Lincoln for more reinforcements before launching a full-scale attack. Pinkerton's spies said the Confederate Army totaled up to 200,000 troops when, in fact, the available Confederates numbered about 50,000. McClellan believed the Confederates were trying to lure him into a fatal attack outside Richmond (the North had recently been unexpectedly beaten at Bull Run).
When the Confederates attacked, McClellan suspected a ruse, and pulled back. Robert E. Lee replaced the wounded Gen. Joe Johnston as the Confederate commander, and Lee's aggressiveness confused McClellan. He was convinced he was outnumbered when Gen. Jeb Stuart's cavalry rode completely around his army, confirming his worst fears. He retreated.
Pseudonym
Pinkerton went under the pseudonym "Major E.J. Allen" and his continued "intelligence" reports of Confederate strength and guile caused McClellan to fritter away opportunity after opportunity. Oddly, the deposed Gen. Scott never trusted Pinkerton's information, and always felt the Union was far stronger than the Confederacy.
McClellan was fired after the battle of Antietam (25,000 casualties), which the Union should have won, but fought piecemeal, with troops held back. Gen. Lee was able to salvage a stalemate while inflicting horrendous casualties. At Antietam, Lee's reinforcements arrived in the nick of time.
After Antietam, Pinkerton's stock fell - as did McClellan's. President Lincoln's quest for a general who would fight and not rest after each battle, continued until Ulysses Grant got command.
On the Confederate side, Gen. Lee is on record as saying his great advantage was that as a former commandant of West Point, he knew all the Union generals and their foibles, and could anticipate what they were likely to do in given situations. Shelby Foote quotes Lee as saying some day the Union Army would find a general he didn't know and couldn't predict - but they never did.
Even Gen. Grant, in the last year of the war, lost most of the battles, suffered greater casualties, but had such superior numbers he won through attrition.
Ironically, the use of military "intelligence" in the U.S. Civil War was limited, and its greatest use by the Union resulted in Confederate victory and survival.
As an admirer of Keegan, I wish he'd explore the Pinkerton/intelligence phenomenon. But Pinkerton is not even mentioned in his new book.
Keegan does remark on the wonder that the Confederacy did as well as it did, considering the North's population of 32 million exceeded the 11 seceding states' five million people, and that 94% of America's manufactured goods were produced in the North. Unlike the North, the South was easy to blockade.
So the war should have been no contest.
On reflection, perhaps the war would have ended earlier had not the Union Army depended on "intelligence" it should have ignored.
Letters to the editor should be sent to editor@tor.sunpub.com
 World Fact Book (CIA)]
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